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A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDICARE 
PAYMENT AND SERVICE VOLUME FOR CATARACT, GLAUCOMA, AND 
RETINA PROCEDURES FROM 2005 TO 2009. Dan A. Gong, Jun Lin, and James C. 
Tsai. Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Science, Yale University School of 
Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent to which changes in the 
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule influence the volume and intensity of ophthalmic 
services for cataract, glaucoma, and retina procedures. 
We conducted a retrospective, longitudinal analysis using a fixed-effects 
regression model of Medicare Part B carriers representing all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia from 2005 to 2009 to calculate Medicare payment-volume elasticities, 
defined as the percent change in Medicare service volume per 1% change in Medicare 
payment, for twelve procedures: non-complex and complex cataract surgery (CPT 66984 
and CPT 66982), laser trabeculoplasty (CPT 65855), trabeculectomy without and with 
previous surgery (CPT 66170 and CPT 66172), aqueous shunt to reservoir (CPT 66180), 
laser iridotomy (CPT 66761), scleral reinforcement with graft (CPT 67255), intravitreal 
injection (CPT 67028), laser treatment for retinal edema (CPT 67210), laser treatment for 
proliferative retinopathy (CPT 67228), and optical coherence tomography (OCT) imaging 
(CPT 92135). 
 For cataract surgery, we found a significant negative Medicare payment-service 
volume elasticity. For every 1% decrease in non-complex cataract surgery payment, non-
complex cataract service volume increased 0.27% (95% CI [-0.47, -0.06], p=0.01). For 
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every 1% decrease in complex cataract surgery payment, complex cataract service 
volume increased 1.34% (95% CI [-1.54, -1.14], p<0.001). For glaucoma procedures, the 
payment-volume elasticity was non-significant for four of six procedures studied: laser 
trabeculoplasty (elasticity=-0.27, 95% CI [-1.31, 0.77], p=0.61), trabeculectomy without 
previous surgery (elasticity=-0.42, 95% CI [-0.85, 0.01], p=0.053), trabeculectomy with 
previous surgery (elasticity=-0.28, 95% CI [-0.83, 0.28], p=0.32), and aqueous shunt to 
reservoir (elasticity=-0.47, 95% CI [-3.32, 2.37], p=0.74). For laser iridotomy, the 
payment-volume elasticity was -1.06 (95% CI [-1.39, -0.72], p<0.001). For scleral 
reinforcement with graft, the payment-volume elasticity was -2.92 (95% CI [-5.72, -
0.12], p=0.041). For all three retinal procedures, the regression coefficients representing 
the payment-volume elasticity were non-significant: intravitreal injection elasticity was -
0.75 (95% CI [-1.62, 0.13], p=0.09); laser treatment for retinal edema elasticity was 0.14 
(95% CI [-0.38, 0.65], p=0.59); and laser treatment for proliferative retinopathy elasticity 
was 0.05 (95% CI [-0.26, 0.35], p=0.77). For every 1% decrease in Medicare payment for 
OCT imaging, OCT imaging service volume increased 0.84% (95% CI [-1.36, -0.32], 
p=0.002). 
Our analysis of twelve ophthalmic procedures from 2005 to 2009 suggest that 
there may not be a significant association between Medicare payment and service volume 
for many glaucoma and retina procedures. Among those procedures, including cataract 
surgery, that have a significant relationship, different elasticities are observed, suggesting 
that the volume response to changes in Medicare payments is not uniform across all 
Medicare procedures. Further research should explore the contributions of patient 
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The national debate on improving the economic outlook of the United States has 
prompted discussions about effective means to reduce healthcare spending. Currently 
representing 18% of gross domestic product (GDP), healthcare expenditures are projected 
to rise to 25% of GDP by 2037.1 Concerns about healthcare spending at these levels 
include the unsustainable growth in the national debt and diversion of resources away 
from other domains.1 Among public healthcare expenditures, Medicare spending 
continues to outpace overall economic growth, adding to these concerns.2 Congress first 
introduced the modern-day physician fee schedule for rendered Medicare services in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1989, and then later introduced the 
sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula with the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997. Through the SGR formula, policymakers have sought to contain Medicare 
spending by adjusting payment rates for over ten thousand practitioner services. Although 
the SGR’s implementation was intended to adjust Medicare payments according to 
overall economic growth, policymakers and physicians alike have viewed the SGR as a 
failed measure both to control healthcare spending and to promote healthcare quality.3,4  
 Irrespective of Congress’ decision to delay or repeal the SGR in future years, the 
original enactment of the SGR to address the increasing volume and intensity of 
physician services raised the following question: to what extent can changes in Medicare 
payment contain healthcare spending? The answer to this question depends on how 
physicians (the supply) and patients (the demand) respond to price changes for 
procedures and services. When the Medicare Fee Schedule (now Medicare Physician Fee 
Schedule or MPFS) was first implemented under OBRA 1989, both the Health Care 
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Financing Administration (HCFA, now Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services or 
CMS) and the Congressional Budget Office assumed that in response to fee reductions, 
physicians would recuperate one-half of lost revenue by increasing the volume and 
complexity of services, which the HCFA termed the “50% behavioral offset.”5 This 
assumption of a behavioral offset was largely based on empirical work conducted by the 
Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC, now the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission or MedPAC).6,7 Subsequent studies by both the HCFA Office of the Actuary 
and independent researchers have found the “physician volume-and-intensity response” 
for Medicare payment reductions to be lower at 30-40%.8,9 Based on these studies, CMS 
believes that “there is a statistically significant relationship between Medicare price 
reductions for physicians' services and partially offsetting increases in the volume and 
intensity of such services.”10 However, the last major study to examine this relationship 
used data from 1994 to 1996. Thus, new research using updated data would be useful to 
study the extent Medicare price changes influence the volume and intensity of services 
rendered in today’s healthcare landscape.  
To answer this question within the field of ophthalmology, we analyzed the 
association between Medicare payment and service volume for cataract, glaucoma, and 
retina procedures from 2005 to 2009.  
 
1.1 Cataracts 
 The choice to study cataract surgery was made for several reasons. First, it is the 
most commonly performed surgical procedure among Medicare beneficiaries in the U.S., 
representing a significant proportion of Medicare expenditure.11 According to the 
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National Health Interview Survey, 31.0% of Americans between 65 and 74 years old and 
53.4% of Americans older than 75 years old have been diagnosed with cataracts.12 The 
estimated total prevalence of cataracts in Americans 65 years of age and older is 15.6 
million.12 Previous research has found that 61.8 cataract surgeries were performed per 
1000 person-years among the Medicare fee-for-service population.11 Fifty percent of 
cataract surgeries were performed at an ambulatory surgery center, and fifty percent were 
performed at a hospital-based operating room, with nearly 12,000 different surgeons 
performing at least one cataract operation during this period.11 Recent figures from the 
Beaver Dam Eye Study have also found continually increasing rates of lens extraction 
over the past two decades.13 Second, Medicare is the single largest payer for cataract 
surgery, and an estimated 80% of cataract surgeries are performed on Medicare 
patients.14 Because the vast majority of cataract surgeries are paid for within the 
Medicare system, there is less concern for non-Medicare policies influencing the 
association between Medicare payment and Medicare cataract service volume compared 
to other procedures performed in patient populations with greater diversity in both age 
and insurance providers. And third, the MPFS contains two different Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT) codes for cataract surgeries: one for non-complex types (CPT 66984) 
and one for complex types (CPT 66982) wherein the latter – requiring devices or 
techniques not used in routine cataract surgery – is compensated a higher dollar amount. 
The existence of two different procedures for a similar indication allows for the 






Glaucoma is a leading cause of blindness in the United States. Previous figures 
have estimated that glaucoma affects 2.2 million Americans.15 However, recent research 
has estimated that this number is likely higher, finding that approximately 2.4 million 
Americans have undiagnosed and untreated glaucoma, which represents over three-
quarters of all patients with glaucoma.16 Glaucoma represents the most common cause of 
blindness in Hispanic persons, the second most common cause in black persons, and the 
third most common cause in white persons.17 Moreover, black persons and Hispanic 
persons are 4.4 times and 2.5 times to have undiagnosed and untreated glaucoma 
compared to white persons.16 As a disease of aging, glaucoma represents a significant 
portion of annual Medicare expenditures: in 2000, $1.2 billion were spent on glaucoma 
treatment, second only to cataract-related expenditures among major eye diseases.18 
 
1.3 Retina 
The number of Americans with visual impairment secondary to retinal diseases 
has increased over time.12 Age-related macular degeneration (AMD) and diabetic 
retinopathy (DR) combined are the leading causes of blindness among white and 
Hispanic persons in the United States.17 Among adults over the age of eighteen, AMD is 
estimated to affect 1.1% of the US population and exhibits an age-related increase in 
prevalence. Among the 65-74 year old population, 2.8% have AMD; among the 75 and 
older population, 8.7% have AMD. Patients with advanced AMD in at least one eye 
number 1.75 million. Diabetic retinopathy affects an even greater population of 
Americans at an estimated 4 million, and 20% of those affected have vision-threatening 
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DR.12 As a percentage of US adults with diabetes, 28.5% and 4.4% of patients have 
diabetic retinopathy and vision-threatening DR, respectively, according to recent 
estimates.19 Although Medicare spending for retinal therapy ranks behind cataract 
surgery and glaucoma treatment, per Medicare beneficiary expenditure for AMD and DR 





2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE  
The purpose of this study was to provide a timely, five-year, quantitative analysis 
of Medicare payment and ophthalmic services volume using data for the entire United 
States. We included the following twelve procedures – two for cataract, six for glaucoma, 
and four for retina – to study the most commonly performed ophthalmic procedures. 
 
Cataract 
 CPT 66984 – non-complex cataract surgery  
 CPT 66982 – complex cataract surgery 
Glaucoma 
 CPT 65855 – laser trabeculoplasty 
 CPT 66170 – trabeculectomy without previous surgery 
 CPT 66172 – trabeculectomy with previous surgery 
 CPT 66180 – aqueous shunt to reservoir 
 CPT 66761 – laser iridotomy 
 CPT 67255 – scleral reinforcement with graft 
Retina 
 CPT 67028 – intravitreal injection 
 CPT 67210 – laser treatment for retinal edema 
 CPT 67228 – laser treatment for proliferative retinopathy 




For each service, we first described national trends in Medicare payment and 
service volume from 2005 to 2009. We then examined the change in service volume for 
each procedure following Medicare payment changes by calculating payment-volume 
elasticities—defined as the percent change in Medicare service volume per 1% change in 





3.1 Data Sources 
This study utilized a retrospective, longitudinal analysis of Medicare Part B 
carriers representing all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Part B carriers are 
organizations contracted by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) that 
exercise jurisdiction over a defined geographical area, usually a state, to administer 
Medicare Part B policies. For each carrier, 2005-2009 service volume data for each 
procedure were obtained through CMS’s Part B Carrier Summary Data Files20, which 
includes billed services for the physician/surgeon, assistant surgeon, and ambulatory 
surgery center facility service charge by CPT code for each procedure we analyzed (CPT 
66984, CPT 66982, CPT 65855, CPT 66170, CPT 66172, CPT 66180, CPT 66761, CPT 
67255, CPT 67028, CPT 67210, CPT 67228, CPT 92135). Payment data from 2005 to 
2009 were obtained through the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which listed the 
Facility Price for each procedure.21 Because MPFS data for eighteen states were listed by 
sub-divisions within carriers, payment for these states were weighted by population data 
from the US Census Bureau22 to determine a single fee schedule amount corresponding to 
each carrier, thus matching the reported service volume data. All fee schedule amounts 
were adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index23 using 2005 as the 
base year.  
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
We calculated payment-volume elasticities—defined as the percent change in 
Medicare service volume per 1% change in Medicare payment—for each procedure using 
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a fixed-effects regression model, a standard technique used by the PPRC and other 
research groups to assess the volume response to payment changes.7,9,24 In our model, the 
Medicare Part B carrier where the procedure was performed served as the independent 
unit of analysis. 
For each carrier, the MPFS formula is adjusted by a Geographic Practice Cost 
Index (GPCI) to account for regional variations in practice costs, resulting in differences 
in year-to-year Medicare payment changes across carriers.25 This across-carrier variation 
creates a natural experiment to isolate the association between Medicare payment and 
service volume within a single carrier. We included a dummy variable representing each 
Medicare Part B carrier in the regression model to account for inter-carrier heterogeneity 
that was stable over time.26 Thus, the model controlled for time-invariant regional 
variations in procedure demand, patient demographics, and physician practices. We 
included an additional time variable to control for national trends in service volume due 
to factors that affected the entire country. The regression model also controlled for 
carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary population, number of ophthalmologists, 
and income per capita27, in addition to heteroskedasticity to account for non-normally 
distributed standard errors as determined by the modified Wald test. Mathematically, the 
carrier and time fixed-effects regression model can be represented as follows: 
 
Vijk = β0 + β1Pijk + β2Ajk + β3Bjk + β4Cjk + αj – γk + εijk 
 
Vijk = service volume for procedure i in carrier j and year k 
Pijk = Medicare fee for procedure i in carrier j and year k 
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Ajk = number of Medicare beneficiaries in carrier j and year k 
Bjk = number of ophthalmologists in carrier j and year k 
Cjk = income per capita in carrier j and year k 
 β0 = fixed-effects parameter representing the Y-intercept 
αj = fixed-effects parameter that represents the stable characteristics of each 
carrier 
γk = correction for national trend in service volume 
εijk = error term 
 
β1, β2, β3, and β4 are the regression coefficients to be estimated and represent the 
effect of their respective covariates on service volume. Because each variable was log 
transformed, β1 represents the percent change in service volume per 1% change in 
Medicare payment, or the payment-volume elasticity.  
For cataract surgery procedures, we also sought to describe any procedural shifts 
between non-complex and complex cataract surgeries. A similar fixed-effects model was 
used as the aforementioned model except the independent variable P represented the 
summed MPFS amount for CPT 66982 and 66984 and the dependent variable V 
represented the proportion of total cataract services billed under the complex procedure 
code.  
All regression analyses were conducted using StataMP 13 (StataCorp LP, College 





3.3 Projection Analysis 
 For calculating Medicare payment-service volume elasticities, data up to 2009 
were included in the regression analysis. In 2010, the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule’s 
payment formula changed on June 1: the conversion factor for the remaining year was 
2.2% higher than it was for the first five months.28 Rather than analyzing 2010 data in the 
regression and potentially calculating inaccurate estimates due to mismatch in the timing 
of payment and service volume data, this study used data starting in 2010 in a set of 
projection analyses to determine the accuracy of the Medicare payment-service volume 
elasticities derived from 2005-2009 figures. Termed the Elasticity-Adjusted Projection 
Model (EAPM), the following formulas were used to predict non-complex and complex 
cataract surgical volumes for 2010 and 2011: 
 
PV2010 = AV2009 x (1 + β x ΔP2009-2010) x (1 + ΔG2009-2010) x (1 + γ) 
PV2011 = PV2010 x (1 + β x ΔP2010-2011) x (1 + ΔG2010-2011) x (1 + γ) 
 
PVt = predicted volume in year t 
AVt = actual volume in year t 
β = Medicare payment-service volume elasticity 
ΔPt1-t2 = percent change in Medicare payment (calculated as a weighted average 
across carriers) from years t1 to t2 




γ = average yearly trend in national cataract service volume calculated between 
2005 and 2009 
 
The predictions from this model were then compared to an Unadjusted Projection 
Model (UPM) that excluded Medicare payment-service volume elasticity and only 
factored in Medicare beneficiary population and the average yearly trend in cataract 
service volume. Both models were benchmarked against actual 2010 and 2011 service 
volumes for CPT 66982 and 66984 procedures. 
 
3.4 Hypothetical Scenario 
 To understand the magnitude of the Medicare payment-service volume elasticities 
on an individual physician level, a hypothetical scenario was constructed of an 
ophthalmologist responding to 5%, 10%, and 20% reductions in the Medicare fee 
schedule for CPT 66982 and 66984. The scenario assumed that the ophthalmologist 
performed 100 cataract surgeries prior to the payment decline, and the pre-reduction 
payment amounts and ratio of non-complex to complex cataract surgeries were based on 
actual 2011 figures. The elasticity response, describing the change in service volume, was 
calculated by multiplying the Medicare payment-service volume elasticity with the 
percent change in Medicare payment (5%, 10%, or 20%). 
 





4.1.1 National Trends (Table 1, Figures 1 and 2) 
From 2005 to 2008, average Medicare payment across carriers representing all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia decreased every year for both the lower-paid 
non-complex and higher-paid complex cataract surgeries, but 2009 saw a small increase 
in Medicare fees for both types of procedures. During this five-year period, average 
Medicare payment for non-complex cataract surgery decreased from $671.22 to $573.79 
(2005 $), a real value decline of 14.5%. For complex cataract surgery, average payment 
decreased from $898.92 in 2005 to $806.33 in 2009 (2005 $), a real value decline of 
10.3%. Although payment trends for both procedures mirrored each other closely, the 
pattern of changes in Medicare service volume differed greatly. The volume of services 
billed for non-complex cataract surgery decreased 5.6% from 3,372,757 services/year in 
2005 to 3,185,130 services/year in 2009; in contrast, the volume of services billed for 
complex cataract surgery increased 105.1% from 112,331 services/year in 2005 to 
230,429 services/year in 2009. In aggregate, the total volume of non-complex and 
complex cataract services decreased from 3,485,088 services/year in 2005 to 3,415,559 
services/year in 2009, a 2.0% decline. Due to the increase in the volume of complex 
relative to non-complex cataract services, the proportion of total cataract services billed 
under the complex procedure more than doubled from 3.2% in 2005 to 6.7% in 2009 with 





Table 1. Trends in Medicare Payment and Cataract Service Volume, 2005-2009. 
Table 1. Trends in Medicare Payment and Cataract Service Volume, 2005-2009 





(services/year) 3,372,757 3,273,864 3,204,754 3,132,367 3,185,130 
Average payment 





(services/year) 112,331 143,108 170,424 200,453 230,429 
Average payment 




Figure 1. Medicare Payment and Service Volume for Non-Complex (CPT 66984) and 
Complex (CPT 66982) Cataract Surgeries. 
For each year, service volume equaled the total number of allowed services, including 
surgeon, assistant surgeon, and ambulatory surgery center facility service charges, for 
cataract surgeries performed in Medicare carriers representing all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. Average payment equaled the weighted average of procedure 
payments determined by the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule across those carriers and 
is adjusted for inflation using 2005 as the base year.  








































































































Figure 2. Proportion of Total Cataract Services Billed under the Complex Procedure 
Code.  
Proportion of Total Cataract Services Billed under Complex Procedure is defined as 



























































4.1.2 Regression Results (Table 2) 
 Using a fixed-effects regression model controlling for time-invariant carrier-
specific characteristics, carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary population, number 
of ophthalmologists, and income per capita, and national trends in cataract service 
volume, we calculated payment-volume elasticities for non-complex and complex 
cataract surgeries to describe the association between Medicare payment and cataract 
service volume. For non-complex cataract surgery, the payment-volume elasticity was -
0.27: for every 1% decrease in Medicare payment for CPT 66984, non-complex cataract 
service volume increased 0.27% (95% CI [-0.47, -0.06], p=0.01). For complex cataract 
surgery, the payment-volume elasticity was -1.34: for every 1% decrease in Medicare 
payment for CPT 66982, complex cataract service volume increased 1.34% (95% CI [-
1.54, -1.14], p<0.001). Thus, the response observed for payment changes to complex 
cataract surgery was approximately three times the response for payment changes to non-
complex cataract surgery. When the sum total of CPT 66982 and 66984 payments 
decreased by 1%, the proportion of total cataract surgeries billed as complex increased by 




Table 2. Association between Medicare Payment and Cataract Service Volume, 2005-
2009. 
A Fixed effects model controlling for carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary 
population, number of ophthalmologists, and income per capita, and for national trends in 
cataract service volume. 
B Fixed effects model controlling for carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary 
population, number of ophthalmologists, and income per capita, and for national trends in 
the proportion of total cataract services billed under complex procedure.  
* Significant at 0.05 level ** Significant at 0.01 level *** Significant at 0.001 level 
 
Procedure Variable % Change in Volume  or Proportion [95% CI] p-value 
 CPT 66984 Payment (% Change) -0.27 [-0.47, -0.06] 0.013* 
 
Medicare Beneficiary Population 
(% Change) 1.31 [-0.25, 2.86] 0.10 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists (% 
Change) -0.03 [-0.58, 0.53] 0.92 
Non-Complex Cataract  
Service Volume (CPT 66984)A Income Per Capita (% Change) 0.57 [0.12, 1.02] 0.014* 
 Year     
 
 2006 -0.11 [-0.17, -0.06] <0.001*** 
 
 2007 -0.18 [-0.26, -0.10] <0.001*** 
 
 2008 -0.28 [-0.39, -0.17] <0.001*** 
    2009 -0.26 [-0.37, -0.14] <0.001*** 
 CPT 66982 Payment (% Change) -1.34 [-1.54, -1.14] <0.001*** 
 
Medicare Beneficiary Population 
(% Change) 1.88 [-0.07, 3.83] 0.06 
Complex Cataract Service 
Volume (CPT 66982)A 
Number of Ophthalmologists (% 
Change) -0.55 [-1.84, 0.74] 0.40 
 
Income Per Capita (% Change) 0.42 [-0.47, 1.30] 0.35 
26 
 
 Year     
 
 2006 0.11 [-0.01, 0.24] 0.08 
 
 2007 0.22 [0.05, 0.38] 0.012* 
 
 2008 0.26 [0.04, 0.48] 0.02** 
    2009 0.42 [0.21, 0.64] <0.001*** 
 
CPT 66982 + CPT 66984 
Payment (% Change) -1.05 [-1.37, -0.73] <0.001*** 
 
Medicare Beneficiary Population 
(% Change) 0.75 [-0.97, 2.47] 0.39 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists (% 
Change) -0.47 [-1.49, 0.54] 0.36 
Proportion of Total Cataract 
Services Billed under Complex 
ProcedureB 
Income Per Capita (% Change) -0.08 [-0.82, 0.66] 0.83 
 Year     
 
 2006 0.21 [0.12, 0.31] <0.001*** 
 
 2007 0.33 [0.20, 0.46] <0.001*** 
 
 2008 0.45 [0.28, 0.63] <0.001*** 




4.1.3 Projection Analysis (Figure 3) 
 For projecting non-complex and complex cataract surgical volumes, the 
Elasticity-Adjusted Projection Model factoring in the estimated Medicare payment-
service volume elasticity was more accurate than the Unadjusted Projection Model. 
Compared to the actual non-complex cataract surgical volume in 2010, EAPM’s 
prediction error was 1.3% versus UPM’s prediction error of 4.0%; for 2011 non-complex 
cataract surgical volume, the EAPM’s prediction error was 6.1% versus 9.6% for UPM. 
Similarly, EAPM was more accurate than UPM for predicting 2010 complex cataract 
surgical volume (prediction error: -3.2% vs. 10.4%, respectively) and 2011 complex 





Figure 3. Projection of Cataract Surgical Volume and Proportion of Total Cataract 
Surgeries Billed as Complex for 2010 and 2011. 
Elasticity-Adjusted Projection Model (EAPM) used the Medicare payment-service 
volume elasticity and Medicare payment-proportion of complex cataract surgery 
elasticity, Medicare beneficiary population growth, and average yearly trend in cataract 
surgical volume and proportion over the 2005 to 2009 time frame to predict surgical 
volume and proportion in 2010 and 2011. Unadjusted Projection Model (UPM) only used 
Medicare beneficiary population growth and average yearly trends.  

































































4.1.4 Hypothetical Example (Table 3) 
In a hypothetical scenario based on 2011 figures, we assumed that an 
ophthalmologist performed 8.32 CPT 66982 procedures reimbursed at $899.71 and 91.68 
CPT 66984 procedures reimbursed at $643.31 prior to a payment decline. The pre-
reduction income from performing cataract surgeries was $66,464.10. Without any 
elasticity response, a 10% decline in payment would reduce that income to $59,817.69, a 
decline of $6,646.41. However, factoring the elasticity response, the post-reduction 
income is only reduced to $62,153.63, a decline of $4,310.47. For this ophthalmologist, 
approximately one-third (35.1%) of the lower income from reduced Medicare payment is 
recouped by performing more surgeries. Declines of 5% and 20% in Medicare payment 





Table 3. Hypothetical Scenario of Elasticity Response to 5%, 10%, and 20% Reduction in 
Medicare Payment. 
A Assume that the pre-reduction surgical volumes for CPT 66982 is 8.32 procedures and 
for CPT 66984 is 91.68 procedures (total cataract surgeries performed = 100), and the 
pre-reduction Medicare payments for CPT 66982 is $899.71 and for CPT 66984 is 
$643.31 (pre-reduction income = $66,464.10). Ratio of complex to non-complex cataract 
surgeries and payment figures (presented in 2005 $) are based on 2011 data.  
 
 Pre-Reduction
A 5% Reduction 10% Reduction 20% Reduction 
Payment     
    66982 $899.71 $854.73 $809.74 $719.77 
    66984 $643.31 $611.14 $578.98 $514.65 
Surgical Volume     
    66982 8.32 8.88 9.44 10.55 
    66984 91.68 92.92 94.16 96.63 
Income without Elasticity 
Response $66,464.10 $63,140.89 $59,817.69 $53,171.28  
(% of Pre-Reduction Income) (100.0%) (95.0%) (90.0%) (80.0%) 
Income with Elasticity Response - $64,373.75 $62,153.63 $57,324.06  
(% of Pre-Reduction Income)   (96.9%) (93.5%) (86.3%) 
Change in Income from Elasticity 
Response - +$1,232.86 +$2,335.94 +$4,152.78 
    Change in Income from 
    Performing More 66982 
    Procedures 
-   +$476.46   +$902.76   +$1,604.91 
    Change in Income from 
    Performing More 66984 
    Procedures 





4.2.1 National Trends (Table 4, Figure 4) 
 From 2005 to 2009, the three highest paid glaucoma procedures by Medicare 
were trabeculectomy with previous surgery ($1097.49-$1171.62), trabeculectomy 
without previous surgery ($873.62-$940.67), and aqueous shunt to reservoir ($858.69-
$978.26). For all six glaucoma procedures studied, average Medicare payment across 
carriers representing all fifty states and the District of Columbia decreased over the five 
years. Payments for trabeculectomy without and with previous surgery were the most 
stable with real value declines of only 5.3% and 4.4%, respectively, whereas payments 
for laser trabeculoplasty and scleral reinforcement with graft declined the most at 18.0% 
and 12.0%, respectively. 
 During the time frame studied, the two most highly performed glaucoma 
procedures were laser trabeculoplasty (889,641 billed services) and laser iridotomy 
(457,414 billed services), followed by trabeculectomy without previous surgery (165,535 
billed services), aqueous shunt to reservoir (73,231 billed services), trabeculectomy with 
previous surgery (69,682 billed services), and scleral reinforcement with graft (47,916 
billed services). The volume of billed services for two of the six procedures, 
trabeculectomy without and with previous surgery, decreased from 2005 to 2009. The 
two procedures with the greatest increase in Medicare service volume were aqueous 





Table 4. Trends in Medicare Payment and Glaucoma Service Volume, 2005-2009. 
     
Table 4. Trends in Medicare Payment and Glaucoma Service Volume, 2005-2009 





(services/year) 175,910 173,459 167,866 184,216 188,190 
Average payment 






(services/year) 39,051 36,402 32,147 30,231 27,704 
Average payment 






(services/year) 15,808 15,565 13,316 12,921 12,072 
Average payment 





(services/year) 11,674 13,160 16,014 16,451 15,932 
Average payment 
(in 2005 $) $978.26 $955.42 $916.04 $858.69 $881.26 
Laser iridotomy  
(CPT 66761) 
Service volume 
(services/year) 83,429 83,671 83,739 103,113 103,462 
Average payment 
(in 2005 $) $371.15 $367.40 $361.36 $340.35 $339.63 
Scleral 
reinforcement 
with graft (CPT 
67255) 
Service volume 
(services/year) 7,472 8,639 9,574 10,135 12,096 
Average payment 
(in 2005 $) $717.75 $704.73 $673.93 $626.91 $631.51 




Figure 4. Medicare Payment and Service Volume for Glaucoma Procedures. 
For each year, service volume equaled the total number of allowed services, including 
surgeon, assistant surgeon, and ambulatory surgery center facility service charges, for 
cataract surgeries performed in Medicare carriers representing all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. Average payment equaled the weighted average of procedure 
payments determined by the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule across those carriers and 
is adjusted for inflation using 2005 as the base year.  


















































B) Trabeculectomy without previous surgery  
 
































































































D) Aqueous shunt to reservoir  
 











































































































































4.2.2 Regression Results (Table 5) 
 Using a fixed-effects regression model controlling for time-invariant carrier-
specific characteristics, carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary population, number 
of ophthalmologists, income per capita, and national trends in glaucoma services volume, 
we calculated the payment-volume elasticity for each procedure to describe the 
association between Medicare payment and glaucoma services volume. For four of the 
six glaucoma procedures studied – laser trabeculoplasty, trabeculectomy without previous 
surgery, trabeculectomy with previous surgery, and aqueous shunt to reservoir – the 
regression coefficients were non-significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, there is a lack of 
evidence to suggest an association between changes in Medicare payment and changes in 
service volume for these four procedures. The regression coefficients were significant for 
two procedures: laser iridotomy and scleral reinforcement with graft. For laser iridotomy, 
the payment-volume elasticity was -1.06 (95% CI [-1.39, -0.72], p<0.001): for every 1% 
decrease in Medicare payment for CPT 66761, laser iridotomy service volume increased 
1.06%. For scleral reinforcement with graft, the payment-volume elasticity was -2.92 
(95% CI [-5.72, -0.12], p=0.041): for every 1% decrease in Medicare payment for CPT 




Table 5. Association between Medicare Payment and Glaucoma Service Volume, 2005-
2009. 
A Fixed effects model controlling for carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary 
population, number of ophthalmologists, and income per capita, and for national trends in 
glaucoma services volume. 
* Significant at 0.05 level ** Significant at 0.01 level *** Significant at 0.001 level 
 
Procedure Variable % Change in Volume [95% CI] p-value 
 
CPT 65855 Payment (% 
Change) -0.27 [-1.31, 0.77] 0.61 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 4.07 [-1.36, 9.51] 0.14 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) 0.16 [-1.22, 1.54] 0.82 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 0.80 [-0.93, 2.52] 0.36 
Laser trabeculoplasty Year     
(CPT 65855)A 
 2006 -0.11 [-0.31, 0.08] 0.25 
 
 2007 -0.17 [-0.38, 0.04] 0.10 
 
 2008 -0.25 [-0.56, 0.06] 0.11 
    2009 -0.29 [-0.62, 0.04] 0.087 
 
CPT 66170 Payment (% 
Change) -0.42 [-0.85, 0.01] 0.053 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 1.58 [-1.09, 4.26] 0.24 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) -0.39 [-1.13, 0.35] 0.30 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) -0.40 [-1.65, 0.85] 0.52 
Trabeculectomy without previous 
surgery Year     
(CPT 66170)A 




 2007 -0.26 [-0.45, -0.07] 0.009** 
 
 2008 -0.34 [-0.61, -0.07] 0.013* 
    2009 -0.50 [-0.81, -0.19] 0.002** 
 
CPT 66172 Payment (% 
Change) -0.28 [-0.83, 0.28] 0.32 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) -0.23 [-3.03, 2.58] 0.87 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) -0.27 [-1.57, 1.03] 0.68 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 0.69 [-0.57, 1.94] 0.28 
Trabeculectomy with previous 
surgery Year     
(CPT 66172)A 
 2006 -0.10 [-0.25, 0.05] 0.18 
 
 2007 -0.25 [-0.47, -0.03] 0.025* 
 
 2008 -0.36 [-0.67, -0.05] 0.025* 
    2009 -0.37 [-0.66, -0.08] 0.012* 
 
CPT 66180 Payment (% 
Change) -0.47 [-3.32, 2.37] 0.74 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 0.87 [-1.71, 3.45] 0.50 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) -1.85 [-3.34, -0.36] 0.016* 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 1.45 [0.06, 2.83] 0.041* 
Aqueous shunt to reservoir  Year     
(CPT 66180)A 
 2006 -0.11 [-0.33, 0.10] 0.30 
 
 2007 -0.003 [-0.37, 0.37] 0.99 
 
 2008 -0.06 [-0.66, 0.55] 0.85 
    2009 -0.03 [-0.56, 0.50] 0.91 
 
CPT 66761 Payment (% 
Change) -1.06 [-1.39, -0.72] <0.001*** 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 2.54 [0.84, 4.25] 0.004** 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 




Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 0.35 [-0.66, 1.36] 0.49 
Laser iridotomy  Year     
(CPT 66761)A 
 2006 -0.19 [-0.24, -0.04] 0.009** 
 
 2007 -0.16 [-0.32, -0.004] 0.044* 
 
 2008 -0.09 [-0.30, 0.11] 0.38 
    2009 -0.11 [-0.32, 0.10] 0.32 
 
CPT 67255 Payment (% 
Change) -2.92 [-5.72, -0.12] 0.041* 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 3.78 [-0.24, 7.80] 0.065 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) -1.10 [-2.49, 0.28] 0.12 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 1.15 [-0.18, 2.47] 0.088 
Scleral reinforcement with graft  Year     
(CPT 67255)A 
 2006 -0.10 [-0.31, 0.11] 0.37 
 
 2007 -0.20 [-0.54, 0.15] 0.26 
 
 2008 -0.48 [-1.07, 0.11] 0.11 





4.3.1 National Trends (Table 6, Figure 5) 
 When comparing Medicare fees from 2005 to 2009 using the same base year, 
average payments across Medicare Part B carriers declined for intravitreal injection        
(-20.7%), laser treatment for retinal edema (-13.0%), laser treatment for proliferative 
retinopathy (-5.8%), and OCT imaging (-14.2%) during this time period. Among these 
services, payments for the lower-paid services (intravitreal injection and OCT imaging) 
declined to a greater extent than the two higher-paid services (laser treatment for retinal 
edema and laser treatment for proliferative retinopathy). Although payments declined 
nearly every year for every service, laser treatment for retinal edema did see a real-value 
increase from 2008 to 2009, and laser treatment for diabetic retinopathy saw an increase 
from both 2007 to 2008 and 2008 to 2009. 
 Whereas the payment for all four services trended towards the same direction, the 
service volume pattern varied from 2005 to 2009. Total service volume declined by 
13.5% for laser treatment for retinal edema and by 10.4% for laser treatment for 
proliferative retinopathy. Intravitreal injection volume more than quadrupled from 
251,311 services in 2005 to 1,297,524 services in 2009, and OCT imaging volume more 




Table 6. Trends in Medicare Payment and Retina Service Volume, 2005-2009. 
 
Table 6. Trends in Medicare Payment and Retina Service Volume, 2005-2009 





(services/year) 251,311 531,652 812,505 1,019,875 1,297,524 
Average payment 
(in 2005 $) $204.68 $197.26 $176.98 $165.25 $162.23 
Laser 
treatment for 
retinal edema  
(CPT 67210) 
Service volume 
(services/year) 163,321 147,870 139,361 139,993 141,322 
Average payment 







(services/year) 105,701 99,286 93,437 93,919 94,739 
Average payment 
(in 2005 $) $962.54 $920.59 $863.49 $881.02 $907.08 
OCT imaging  
(CPT 92135) 
Service volume 
(services/year) 3,694,241 4,547,713 5,665,420 6,569,035 7,785,030 
Average payment 





Figure 5. Medicare Payment and Service Volume for Retina Procedures and OCT 
Imaging. 
For each year, service volume equaled the total number of allowed services, including 
surgeon, assistant surgeon, and ambulatory surgery center facility service charges, for 
cataract surgeries performed in Medicare carriers representing all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. Average payment equaled the weighted average of procedure 
payments determined by the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule across those carriers and 
is adjusted for inflation using 2005 as the base year.  













































B) Laser treatment for retinal edema  
 














































































































































4.3.2 Regression Results (Table 7) 
 To calculate accurate payment-volume elasticity for each Medicare service, the 
fixed-effects regression model controlled for time-invariant carrier-specific 
characteristics, carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary population, number of 
ophthalmologists, income per capita, and national trends in retinal services volume and 
OCT imaging volume. For all three retinal procedures, the regression coefficients 
representing the payment-volume elasticity were non-significant. For intravitreal 
injection, the elasticity was -0.75 (95% CI [-1.62, 0.13], p=0.09); for laser treatment for 
retinal edema, the elasticity was 0.14 (95% CI [-0.38, 0.65], p=0.59); and for laser 
treatment for proliferative retinopathy, the elasticity was 0.05 (95% CI [-0.26, 0.35], 
p=0.77). For OCT imaging, a significant association between Medicare payment and 
service volume was found: the calculated elasticity was -0.84 (95% CI [-1.36, -0.32], 
p=0.002). In other words, for every 1% decrease in Medicare payment for CPT 92135, 
OCT imaging volume increased 0.84%. 
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Table 7. Association between Medicare Payment and Retina Service Volume, 2005-2009.  
A Fixed effects model controlling for carrier-level changes in Medicare beneficiary 
population, number of ophthalmologists, and income per capita, and national trends in 
service volume. 
* Significant at 0.05 level ** Significant at 0.01 level *** Significant at 0.001 level 
 
Procedure Variable % Change in Volume or Proportion [95% CI] p-value 
 
CPT 67028 Payment (% 
Change) -0.75 [-1.62, 0.13] 0.09 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 1.72 [-0.49, 3.92] 0.12 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) -0.61 [-1.37, 0.14] 0.11 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) -0.45 [-1.45, 0.56] 0.38 
Intravitreal injection Year     
(CPT 67028)A 
 2006 0.70 [0.59, 0.81] <0.001*** 
 
 2007 1.06 [0.85, 1.27] <0.001*** 
 
 2008 1.22 [0.91, 1.54] <0.001*** 
    2009 1.44 [1.10, 1.77] <0.001*** 
 
CPT 67210 Payment (% 
Change) 0.14 [-0.38, 0.65] 0.59 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) -0.70 [-2.18, 0.78] 0.35 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) 0.45 [-0.23, 1.13] 0.19 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) -0.66 [-1.46, 0.13] 0.10 
Laser treatment for retinal 
edema Year     
(CPT 67210)A 
 2006 -0.06 [-0.14, 0.01] 0.11 
 




 2008 -0.01 [-0.20, 0.18] 0.90 
    2009 0.01 [-0.18, 0.21] 0.89 
 
CPT 67228 Payment (% 
Change) 0.05 [-0.26, 0.35] 0.77 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) -0.37 [-2.62, 1.88] 0.74 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) 0.44 [-0.17, 1.06] 0.15 
 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 0.21 [-0.67, 1.09] 0.63 
Laser treatment for 
proliferative retinopathy Year     
(CPT 67228)A 
 2006 -0.06 [-0.15, 0.03] 0.17 
 
 2007 -0.12 [-0.26, 0.01] 0.07 
 
 2008 -0.12 [-0.32, 0.08] 0.25 
    2009 -0.11 [-0.33, 0.10] 0.31 
 
CPT 92135 Payment (% 
Change) -0.84 [-1.36, -0.32] 0.002** 
 
Medicare Beneficiary 
Population (% Change) 2.89 [0.92, 4.81] 0.005** 
 
Number of Ophthalmologists 
(% Change) -0.46 [1.40, 0.48] 0.33 
OCT imaging 
Income Per Capita (% 
Change) 0.42 [-0.43, 1.28] 0.33 
(CPT 92135)A Year     
 
 2006 0.10 [0.01, 0.19] 0.03* 
 
 2007 0.24 [0.11, 0.37] 0.001** 
 
 2008 0.29 [0.10, 0.48] 0.003** 








Our study of two types of cataract procedures found that Medicare service volume 
for non-complex cataract surgery decreased slightly from 2005 to 2009 whereas the 
volume for complex cataract services more than doubled during the same time frame. The 
billing code for non-complex cataract surgery has existed since the implementation of the 
Medicare Fee Schedule, but the code for complex cataract surgery, CPT 66982, was only 
introduced in 2001. One of the most common reasons to perform the more complex 
cataract extraction is when patients are taking alpha-blockers, a class of medications 
known to increase the complexity of cataract operations.29 For the newer complex 
cataract procedure, several factors may explain the observed increase in volume, 
including 1) improved physician understanding of complex cataract surgery billing codes 
over time, 2) increased physician awareness of cataract surgery complications in patients 
taking alpha-blockers, 3) improved history-taking by medical staff to ask about alpha-
blocker use in cataract patients, and 4) increased patient awareness to mention alpha-
blocker use prior to cataract operations.  
The regression analysis we conducted also finds a statistically significant 
association between Medicare payments and service volume for both types of cataract 
surgery. Every 1% decrease in Medicare payment for CPT 66984 was associated with a 
0.27% increase in non-complex cataract service volume, and every 1% decrease in 
Medicare payment for CPT 66982 was associated with a 1.34% increase in complex 
cataract service volume. When payments declined by 1% for both types of cataract 
surgery, the proportion of total cataract services billed under the complex procedure 
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increased by 1.05%, suggesting that decreased payment led to an increase in the intensity 
of services rendered. However, there have been studies conducted on periods of 
decreasing cataract surgery reimbursement directly before and after the implementation 
of the Medicare Fee Schedule that found either no association between Medicare 
payment and surgical volume30 or a direct correlation between the two.31 These studies 
used different regression techniques or examined physician-year data instead of carrier-
level data, which may explain the divergent findings. Moreover, our study also differs in 
that we utilized a 100% sample of Medicare beneficiary data for the entire country 
without excluding data from any Medicare Part B carrier or physician. In line with 
previous research by the PPRC, the HCFA, and other researchers using the fixed-effects 
regression model7,8,9, we find support for an inverse relationship between Medicare fee 
changes and the volume and intensity of cataract surgical services rendered. 
A set of projection analyses was conducted to test the accuracy of the Medicare 
payment-service volume elasticities calculated using 2005 to 2009 data. Compared to the 
Unadjusted Projection Model that excluded the Medicare payment-service volume 
elasticity, the Elasticity-Adjusted Projection Model was more accurate in predicting the 
volumes of CPT 66982 and 66984 surgeries in 2010 and 2011. For both years in which 
Medicare payments actually increased, accounting for the elasticity response helped 
predict the deceleration in the growth rate of cataract surgical volume compared to 
previous years in which Medicare payments largely declined. Although a model to 
accurately predict surgical volume in subsequent years requires knowing more than only 
the Medicare payment-service volume elasticities, these projection analyses demonstrate 





During the 2005 to 2009 time period, Medicare payments for laser 
trabeculoplasty, trabeculectomy without and with previous surgery, aqueous shunt to 
reservoir, laser iridotomy, and scleral reinforcement with graft experienced a real-value 
decline ranging from 4.4% to 18.0%. Over this same period, every procedure except for 
the two types of trabeculectomies had an increase in Medicare service volume ranging 
from 7.0% to 61.9%. The decline in the number of trabeculectomies performed has been 
well documented and is thought to be secondary to the introduction of new drug therapies 
for lowering intraocular pressure.32,33 Based on descriptive data alone, it is difficult to 
determine any relationship between Medicare payment and glaucoma services volume. 
To date, the most thorough prior study examining this relationship concluded that argon 
laser therapy and trabeculectomy volume seem unrelated to reimbursement rates using 
national trend data.32 However, these figures do not take into account a number of factors 
that influence nationwide practice patterns for glaucoma management, including greater 
awareness of new technologies and procedures, better diagnostic tools such as anterior 
segment imaging, and changes in practice guidelines for the use of laser therapy and 
surgery versus medical management. In our study, we controlled for these factors by 
including a time variable to capture the national trend in glaucoma services volume and 
also accounted for unmeasured carrier-specific characteristics that were stable across time 
and for carrier-level changes in demographic and provider numbers. With these 
appropriate controls, we found that only two of the six procedures studied – laser 
iridotomy and scleral reinforcement with graft – had a significant association between 
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Medicare payment and service volume. In 2009, these two procedures accounted for less 
than one third of the total service volume for the six glaucoma procedures included in our 
analysis. 
Previous research has remained mixed about the relationship between the volume 
of Medicare services rendered and payment depending on which procedure is being 
studied. And while initial studies conducted by the Physician Payment Review 
Commission suggested a “50% behavioral offset,” subsequent research have found the 
“physician volume-and-intensity response” for Medicare payment reductions to be lower 
at 30-40%.8,9 Although there is a dearth of previous studies examining Medicare payment 
and volume for glaucoma procedures, one group has studied the relationship between 
remuneration fees and procedure rates of trabeculoplasties, trabeculectomies, and 
glaucoma drainage device implantations in Canada from 1992 to 2007.34 Using a 
regression model that employed within-province comparisons and controlled for temporal 
trends in procedure rates, the authors found no influence of physician remuneration fee 
on procedure rates for these three procedures, consistent with our findings for CPT 
65855, CPT 66170, CPT 66172, and CPT 66180.  
 
5.3 Retina 
 Consistent with the general trend for ophthalmic procedures and services, 
payments for intravitreal injection, laser treatment for retinal edema, laser treatment for 
proliferative retinopathy, and OCT imaging experienced an overall decrease in real terms 
from 2005 to 2009. In contrast, the volume of billed services for these retinal procedures 
and OCT imaging had varying trends over this time period. As previously described, 
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retinal laser therapy use has seen a modest decline over time whereas the volume of 
intravitreal injections has increased substantially.35 For each procedure, total service 
volume for the entire United States is dependent upon a number of factors that influence 
nationwide practice patterns. These include the development of new medications and 
alternative therapies, refinements in pre-existing procedures and surgeries, improvements 
in diagnostic imaging, and changes in practice guidelines based on clinical research 
findings. The impact of these factors is most evident when examining the volume of 
intravitreal injections. The beginning of our study period marked the years in which the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration first approved pegaptanib and ranibizumab for 
treatment of neovascular AMD and the initial studies demonstrating the effectiveness of 
bevacizumab were published.36,37,38,39 With the introduction of anti-VEGF agents 
representing a new frontier in neovascular AMD therapy, it is not surprising to see the 
400% growth in intravitreal injections from 2005 to 2009. In addition to improvements in 
imaging technology, a rise in treatment of AMD patients may partially explain the 
observed increase in OCT imaging as part of the diagnosis and management of 
neovascular AMD.  
 Due to the various factors that influence Medicare service volume over time, it is 
difficult to conclude any associations between payment and service volume based on 
national-level correlations alone. An accurate assessment of this relationship requires 
controlling for both national and local variables that influence service volume 
independent of the Medicare fee schedule. Our use of a fixed-effects regression model 
served this exact purpose, similar to its role in analyzing glaucoma procedures. We 
specifically included a time variable to capture volume trends that affected the entire 
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country. For example, for intravitreal injections, we expected to see a rise in service 
volume independent of Medicare payment changes due to the development of new AMD 
medications. This trend is depicted in the significant positive associations between year 
and intravitreal injection volume for each year 2006-2009 as noted in Table 7. Using our 
model, we found that there exists a statistically significant association between Medicare 
payment and service volume for OCT imaging but not for any of the three retinal 
procedures studied. 
 
5.4 Further Considerations 
Because our analysis did not include physician-level data, it was not possible to 
determine the exact degree of income recoupment seen after payment reductions for 
ophthalmic procedures. We can only hypothesize in a constructed model, but the 
calculated payment-volume elasticities cannot be directly compared to the 30-50% 
“behavioral offset” or “physician response” from prior studies. However, it is clear from 
our study that different procedures, even within the same subspecialty, can have varying 
magnitudes of payment-volume elasticities. Therefore, assigning a single number as the 
volume response to changes in the Medicare fee schedule may oversimplify the 
relationship between Medicare reimbursement rates and procedural volume. Our findings 
also suggest that most glaucoma and retina procedures may not have any association 
between Medicare payment and service volume, raising further flags about grouping all 
Medicare procedures and services together when discussing how healthcare providers and 
consumers respond to changes in Medicare payment. 
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We raise an additional concern about how the relationship between Medicare 
payment and service volume should be characterized moving forward. Two ways that this 
relationship has been referred to in the literature are “behavioral offset” and “physician 
response,” suggesting that physicians are engaging in behavior to recoup lost income 
from declines in Medicare reimbursement by recommending more medical care services 
to patients. However, without examining patient and physician decision-making more 
closely, it may be misleading to conclude that only physicians drive shifts in procedural 
volume. Although a strong income effect can explain why physicians would increase the 
volume of Medicare services rendered when faced with declining Medicare payment, a 
downward-sloping demand curve representing patients’ preferences can also explain why 
decreasing Medicare fees would increase patient demand for services. Lower prices for 
medical care services can induce Medicare beneficiaries to seek more care due to lower 
out-of-pocket expenses from reduced coinsurance payment. In our research, we elected to 
use the term “payment-volume elasticity” as a descriptive term to refer to the association 
between Medicare payment and Medicare service volume. 
 
5.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
Future streams of research should examine data at physician and patient levels to 
determine how the supply and demand for procedures influence payment-volume 
elasticities. For example, for laser iridotomy, increased physician and patient awareness 
of angle closure glaucoma suspects may be important to study as a factor that impacts 
both supply and demand. Similar trends in increased patient awareness of cataracts as a 
surgically reversible cause of decreased vision may increase patient demand for cataract 
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surgery. An additional variable to consider is the role of increased billing charge capture. 
This factor may be particularly important for billing of complex cataract surgery, laser 
iridotomy, and scleral reinforcement with graft. Whether driven by decreasing 
reimbursement levels or unrelated to Medicare payments, increased capture could explain 
the increased service volume for these procedures. In addition, because our findings 
suggest that different procedures for cataract, glaucoma, and retina treatments can have 
varying payment-volume elasticities, further research on procedures both within 
ophthalmology and in other fields of medicine is needed to better characterize the 
variation in the volume response to changes in the Medicare fee schedule across different 
procedures. As part of this characterization, a central question that remains unexplored is 
determining which attributes of a procedure result in that procedure having a significant 
association between payment and service volume. From the provider perspective, one 
such factor to explore is the relationship between the extent to which a procedure 
accounts for a practice’s total revenue and that procedure’s payment-volume elasticity. 
Procedures accounting for a greater percentage of a provider’s income may have more 
significant associations between payment and service volume. Another factor to consider 
is how a procedure’s elective or non-elective nature may affect the impact of Medicare 
reimbursements on service volume: for example, consistent with our findings for 
trabeculectomy, we expect non-elective procedures to have less significant or non-
significant associations between Medicare payment and service volume. Identifying the 
specific factors that make one procedure more elastic than another can help policymakers 




Our analysis of twelve ophthalmic procedures from 2005 to 2009 suggest that 
there may not be a significant association between Medicare payment and service volume 
for many glaucoma and retina procedures. Among those procedures, including cataract 
surgery, that have a significant relationship, different elasticities are observed, suggesting 
that the volume response to changes in Medicare payments is not uniform across all 
Medicare procedures. Approaching the relationship between Medicare payment and 
service volume with a more nuanced perspective will help policymakers attain a more 
accurate understanding regarding the impact of changes in the Medicare physician 
payment system. With forthcoming discussions ranging from a repeal of the SGR 
formula to the creation of a value-based per-patient payment system,40,41,42 a better 
understanding of both patient and physician behavior will lead to more accurate 
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